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ABSTRACT
In a recent article in this journal, David Martens 
(2010) criticized one of my arguments (in Aikin 
2010) against the thesis (TB) that true belief 
is sufficient for knowledge. The argument in 
question was, roughly, that because believing 
TB yields errors in a subject’s self-assessments 
of knowledge, we have evidence that TB is false. 
Martens argues that I failed to show either that TB 
yields such distortions or that such distortions are 
relevant to whether TB is true. Admittedly, my 
argument was cursory, but I don’t see it as such 
a failure. Regardless, given Martens’ criticisms, 
a more detailed version of the argument is called 
for. In what follows, I will briefly sketch what 
I take to be the current state of dialectical play 
with TB and then turn to another articulation of 
the ad hominem argument.
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1.
Crispin Sartwell’s (1991, 1992) case for 
TB was my primary focus. Sartwell’s 
argument comes in two phases. The first 
is the argument from what I call Sartwell 
cases, examples of subjects where they 
seem within their rights to claim they 
know but do not have justification. All the 
subjects have are true beliefs. Sartwell is 
modest about what his cases show, as he 
notes that these have only demonstrated 
that “justification is not a necessary 
condition”, and that more needs to be 
provided to demonstrate that true belief 
is sufficient (Sartwell 1991, 60).
Sartwell’s second argument is a 
dilemma, which is that justification 
is either instrumentally valuable (in 
being a means for true belief) or it is 
categorically required (as a cognitive 
duty). If the former, justification is not 
part of knowledge, but a criterion or 
tool for achieving it. If the latter, then 
justification and truth may conflict as 
ends, which makes knowledge “an 
incoherent notion” (Sartwell 1992, 180).
I argued that Sartwell cases are not 
counter-examples to the requirement of 
justification for knowledge, but rather 
are exemplary of the pragmatics of 
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concessive knowledge-attribution (Aikin 2010, 9). Further, I argued that the second 
horn of Sartwell’s dilemma is not sharp, as the fact that justification and truth may 
conflict is not evidence of incoherence, but is simply a fact of fallibilism (Aikin 
2011, 10). 
And so the positive case for TB does not stand up. A further positive case against TB 
is possible. The front edge of such an argument is one from examples, particularly 
ones I call terrible reasons cases. Consider:
Marlo is a racist, and so as a matter of habit believes the worst of black 
people – most often, that they are criminals. Marlo sees Ken. Ken is black. 
She believes that (k) Ken is a criminal. Ken, it turns out, is a criminal – he 
steals bubble gum from the store.
On TB, Marlo knows that k. That seems counter-intuitive, because Marlo got the 
belief in a way that is contrary to the requirements of reason. Knowledge shouldn’t 
be like that. Perhaps defenders of TB would be willing to bite the bullet with 
Marlo. But it can be less pleasant to do so with another case, consider such a case 
gettierized:
Margo, another racist, is in an elevator with Matt (who is black) and Barbara 
(who is not). Margo believes (m) she is in an elevator with a criminal. Matt 
is not a criminal; however, Barbara is – she steals bubble gum.
On TB, Margo would know m. But Margo arrived at m by terrible reasons, and it 
is not true of Matt, but of Barbara. TB-bullet-biters beware: this one will send you 
to the dentist. 
2. 
The dialectical situation for TB is not very good. In fact, it is bad. To close my 
previous essay, I added a further consideration against TB, namely, that believing it 
makes a person worse at knowledge assessment. It is to this argument that Martens’ 
essay is a response, and as a matter of issue-clarity, it is important to note that even 
if Martens’ criticisms of my ad hominem argument are right, that does not change 
the broader situation for TB.
To be clear, I acknowledge that the case is an ad hominem argument against TB, 
as it is about what happens to people when they believe TB – namely, that they get 
worse at assessing their own and others’ knowledge. Consider the following case:
Marlon is a great lover of the football squad, the Rovers. Marlon believes 
(r) the Rovers will win the cup this year. Marlon is also convinced of TB, 
and so he attributes knowledge that r not only to himself but to all the other 
Rover fans confident in r.
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Now, Marlon self-attributes knowledge that r because he holds that r is true and he 
sees himself as one assenting to it. So he knows it (at least he holds he knows it, 
by transmission). He sees others assenting to or asserting that r, and so attributes 
knowledge to them on that basis of that. The series of thoughts, particularly the 
knowledge-attributions, are in error. TB is to blame, or more particularly, Marlon’s 
belief that TB is true is to blame.  
Let us take a moment for a bit of comparing. Had Marlon believed, instead of 
TB, JTB (that knowledge is justified true belief), he would have performed this 
knowledge-assessment task better. He likely would have viewed his belief as 
mostly enthusiasm, and the same with his mates. And so he would have demurred at 
knowledge-attribution. JTB is false about knowledge, but at least those who believe 
it outperform those who believe TB. 
Martens protests that moves such as these are illicit, as he holds that the following 
propositions are “questionable”:
P1: If a conception of knowledge is true, then believing that conception 
does not make that person epistemically vicious, and
P1’: If a conception of knowledge is true, then believing that conception 
does not make a person more epistemically vicious than she otherwise 
would be. (Martens 2010, 15 and 19)
Martens provides a few counter-examples to thoughts that might support P1 or P1’. 
One is a counter-example to a very general thought:
Why think P1 is true? … (a) Because no truth is such that believing it could 
make a person worse? But common sense recognizes there is dangerous 
knowledge. Consider, for example, an ex-con recovering drug addict who 
would relapse into a life of crime were he to become aware of the heroin 
hidden in the room by a previous resident. (Martens 2010, 16)
The ad hominem argument isn’t about all truths, but about truths regarding our 
concepts. Martens case gets more focused with the next counter-example:
(b) Because no true conceptual analysis is such that it could make a 
person a worse person? But perhaps true conceptual analysis are somehow 
dangerous to think (as the sun is dangerous to view directly)… (Martens 
2010, 16)
Perhaps and somehow, but who has the burden of proof here? It certainly seems 
right that, to take Martens’ Socratic imagery seriously, the clarification of our 
concepts is crucial to the development of virtues and effective action. That was 
why Socrates confronts, for example, Nicias and Laches about their definitions of 
bravery – they are military leaders, and they should know what bravery is. But their 
8accounts fail, and that explains why they are poor leaders (assuming they are the 
same Nicias and Laches of the ill-fated Sicilian expedition). That’s not evidence 
that they need different false conceptions, but true ones. Martens then challenges 
even this thought that the pursuit of those definitions is worthwhile: 
(c) Because no true analysis of the concept of knowledge is such that 
believing it could impair a person’s ability to fulfill her epistemic obligations? 
But perhaps cultivating genuine epistemic virtues requires doing empirical 
science and perhaps doing epistemology is somehow inimical to doing 
empirical science. (Martens 2010, 17)
The problem, though, is that there is a difference between having a true analysis 
of knowledge and doing epistemology. You can have the former without doing 
the latter, and you can (most certainly) have the latter and not have the former. 
Perhaps doing epistemology somehow is inimical to developing virtues. Perhaps. 
But that’s not the issue. The question is whether having an epistemological view or 
other is inimical to epistemic virtues. Martens then provides a counter-example to 
the thought that the proliferation of epistemologically unwarranted beliefs from an 
epistemic principle is evidence that the principle is false. 
Suppose, for example, [a subject] pathologically believes … that spies have 
tapped her telephone and spies always seek to kill anyone whose telephone 
they tap. Suppose this person is psychologically constituted in such a way 
that, for … universal instantiation and modus ponens … she will reason in 
accordance with that conception just in case she believes it; and suppose she 
does believe that conception … ([S]he will believe inferentially that spies 
are seeking to kill her.) Believing a true conception of logically correct 
inference thus makes her more epistemically vicious than she otherwise 
would be. (Martens 2010, 19)
And so Martens’ case is that simply because TB may yield false knowledge-
attributions when believed by someone, that needn’t be evidence that TB is false, as 
modus ponens can yield false knowledge assessments, too, and that’s not evidence 
against modus ponens.
What is necessary here is distinguishing contributing and non-contributing elements 
in these examples. Consider two cases:
Barry believes (with justification) that (s) if Sam is a bachelor, Sam is 
male, and (t) Sam is not a bachelor. Barry also believes that negating the 
antecedent is a valid inference form. So Barry believes (u) Sam is not a 
bachelor, on the basis of s and t.
Jamie needs to get to grandma’s house, but it is snowing. Jake, her 
roommate, just arrived home and he tells her that the roads are fine. Jake 
is lying, because he wants Jamie out of the house. Jamie, though, believes 
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9Jake. This is because she also holds that she should trust the testimony of 
those who’ve had the relevant experiences. The roads, as it turns out, are 
very icy, and Jamie ends up in the ditch.
In both Barry and Jamie cases, the believers have output that does not count as 
knowledge. Both subjects reason impeccably, according to their principles. So what 
explains why they have the errors? Now, Barry’s beliefs s and t do occasion his 
belief that u, but the contributing factor for the error is Barry’s incorrect belief 
that denying the antecedent is valid. In Jamie’s case, the contributing factor for 
her error is that Jake lied to her. Her epistemic principle was just fine. So it is true 
that not all cases of error are cases where a subject has a false epistemic principle. 
In that, Martens is right. But in cases where the other inputs are not erroneous and 
the output is in error, then we have evidence that the principle is the contributing 
factor. 
Let us return to the case of Marlon. Marlon’s inputs are that he believes that r and 
that his friends believe that r. These inputs are not in question, but it seems clear 
that he’s made an error in attributing knowledge that r to himself and others. So the 
contributing factor to the error is the epistemic principle, TB.
Martens’ paranoid telephone user case has epistemically incorrect output (that spies 
will try to kill her), but the contributing factor there is her paranoid beliefs, not her 
commitment to universal instantiation and modus ponens. The thought with Barry, 
though, is that his contributing factor is not the input beliefs, but the principle he 
uses. Marlon is in the same boat. The lesson is that when people have bad input 
for their epistemic judgments, good epistemic principles guiding those judgments 
aren’t going to help. But when people have good input but bad output, it’s the 
principles that are to blame, and we see it in spades with Marlon and Barry. So the 
thought is that if an epistemic principle is the contributing factor for a pattern of 
epistemic error, then we have evidence that the principle is false.
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